

Article:

A Theoretical Analysis of South African Identity and Audience for the 2010 FIFA World Cup

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Introduction

The 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup (2010 FWC) in South Africa was hailed as an historic event that would recast the position of the African continent and the country itself in the global economy and consciousness. Political rhetoric reflected the intention to use the 2010 FWC to benefit all members of South African society, as suggested by then-Deputy and now-President Jacob Zuma on the eve of the bid committee's trip to Zurich on May 10, 2004:

The benefits of this prospect to our nation would be so enormous that we would take the whole evening, outlining what contribution hosting the World Cup would make to our programme of alleviating poverty, creating jobs and generally in social upliftment...not to mention the name we would have carved for South Africa and Africa in the global world, including the impact on the eradication of stereotypes and Afropessimism.¹

Just prior to FIFA's vote on the 2010 host for the World Cup, then-President Thabo Mbeki noted that "nothing could ever serve to energise our people to work for their and Africa's upliftment than to integrate among the tasks of our Second Decade of Democracy and the African Renaissance our successful hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup"². The twin messages of a new (South) African identity and social upliftment proved irresistible to the FIFA selection committee and South Africa was awarded the hosting rights for the 2010 FWC on May 15, 2004.³

The 2010 FIFA World Cup is commonly defined in the literature as a mega-event, which refers to "one-time events that usually generate long-term profound impacts, both positive and negative, on host communities"⁴. One of the most important aspects of the South African government's interest in securing the hosting rights for the 2010 FIFA World Cup was the hope that it would

ameliorate poverty in the country and contribute to the country's larger development agenda which has been in place since the end of apartheid in 1994. Pillay and Bass note, "urban development and renewal has been identified by government as a key national imperative"⁵ and as Matheson and Baade suggest, "no reason seems more compelling...[for hosting a mega-event]...than the promise of an economic windfall"⁶.

Given the scale of the event and its importance to the continent, several scholars have provided analyses of the political economy, identity issues, and sustainability of the economic activity connected to the 2010 FWC. However, two areas have not received significant scholarly attention. First, a postcolonial/postmodern approach, such as that suggested by Appadurai⁷, to investigation of globalization and identity creation around the mega-event has not been undertaken. Second, analysis of the relationships between globalization, identity, the media, and monetization of the event has not been conducted. There is some data available on the flow of monies connected to the event, and given what is known about sponsorships, the size of the audience, and the payment for rights, some analysis and conclusions are possible. I draw upon primary documents available on the FIFA website as well as a number of other secondary sources, to inform the discussion in this paper.

Connecting Identity and Economic Realities: Literature

This paper draws on two strands of literature examining the negotiation and construction of identity in the post-modern era and the potential impact of the 2010 FWC on this process. The first strand is concerned with the negotiation and creation of identity in a deterritorialized, globalized world, primarily represented by Appadurai's description of five "scapes"; the second strand with the political and economic issues connected to South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FWC. These two sets of literature inform further analysis regarding the potential impact of the 2010 FWC on a renewed South African identity and potential economic benefit.

Setting the Stage: Appadurai's Five "Scapes" and South African Identity

The first body of literature included in this analysis contains the theoretical overlay of the postmodern/postcolonial discussion proposed by Appadurai⁸ in which he responds to "inadequately quirky" theories of globalization, referring to some of the well-known Marxist theories of development, such as dependency theory and world systems theory.⁹ These theories have been criticized for a variety of reasons, including their inability to explain the effects of significant international debt, the causes of conflict in developing areas, and the environmental issues influencing global discourse.¹⁰

Appadurai proposes a more complex framework for explaining the "disjunctures"¹¹ between economics, culture, and politics, and suggests the existence of five dimensions of global cultural flow. These five dimensions are termed "(a) ethnoscapescapes; (b) mediascapescapes; (c) technoscapescapes; (d) finanscapescapes; and (e) ideoscapescapes"¹². Every "scape" requires its own discussion, but in brief, the idea of a 'scape allows each of the five dimensions to fluidly encompass the changing nature of each of the contained concepts. For example, Appadurai notes that the "ethnoscape" contains "the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, guestworkers and other moving groups and persons"¹³. Appadurai's model was intended to build the foundation for a "decent global analysis"¹⁴ of disjunctive flows, but no model is capable of encapsulating the entire experience and process of cultural change connected to globalization. In this paper, I use this framework to develop some considerations of the role of FIFA and the government of South Africa in creating or revising an identity connected to the 2010 FWC.

Issues of identity are also influenced by the politics of hosting the 2010 FWC, and a number of recent articles have discussed the political economy of the FIFA World Cup bidding in South Africa. Alegi¹⁵, for example, names three specific objectives which characterized the bid for the 2006 FWC, ultimately awarded to Germany, which were to "heighten the country's international visibility"¹⁶, "elicit national pride and unity"¹⁷, and "offer local powerbrokers an opportunity

to renegotiate or consolidate their position within the power structures of South African sport and society”¹⁸. These three objectives represent the ethnoscape, the ideoscape, and the financescape in Appadurai’s model. The international visibility, the accompanying increase in tourists, and the short-term gains in job growth and improvements in infrastructure associated with the 2010 FWC all serve to reinforce the renewal of South Africa’s “national pride and unity”. The conflation of the intangible objectives of hosting the event and the visible improvements in infrastructure and jobs assured that this renewal would be achieved whether or not the economic benefits for members of the grassroots suggested by the bidding rhetoric materialised.

Another important characteristic of the political rhetoric surrounding South Africa’s bid for the 2010 FWC has been the attempts to “infuse political discourse and a common understanding of mega-events with a development philosophy”¹⁹. South Africa has had experiences with other mega-events, including the Rugby World Cup (1995), the Cricket World Cup (2003) and failed bids for the 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 FWC. Cornelissen and Swart suggest that in working to secure mega-events such as these, developing countries seek to “use [them] to meet specific political or foreign policy goals”²⁰. In the first part of this essay, I use Appadurai’s ‘scapes to map the postcolonial and post-apartheid identity of South Africa, and its relationship to the 2010 FWC, reflecting on writings of scholars like Alegi and Cornelissen and Swart. In addition, I include in this analysis reflection on South Africa and FIFA’s economic stake in hosting.

Economics of Hosting the 2010 FWC

The second set of literature regards the economic consequences and opportunities of hosting the 2010 FWC. One of FIFA’s main concerns in readying South Africa for the 2010 FWC was making sure the stadiums were up to the standards required, and in the example of Cape Town, this meant forgoing the smaller and more accessible Athlone stadium for the larger Green Point stadium. Athlone stadium is home to the Ajax football club in Cape Town and located on the Cape Flats, thus making it a better choice for local football fans,

and in addition, the Green Point stadium construction was significantly more expensive than the Athlone upgrades would have been, a cost borne by the city of Cape Town and the South African government. However, the Green Point location offered better views of the ocean and Table Mountain, two of the most scenic views in Cape Town. Alegi suggests that FIFA's decision to construct the Green Point stadium in Cape Town was "most likely aimed at enhancing the value of its World Cup product"²¹, rather than contributing to South Africa's development, despite the rhetorical connections made by FIFA and local organizing officials.

Speaking of the charitable contributions of FIFA, President Josphe Blatter noted that,

this campaign [Football for Hope Centres] emphasizes the power of football far beyond the boundaries of the pitch. With the help of football fans, celebrities and sponsors, we want to achieve the building of 20 Football for Hope Centres and make a leave [*sic*] a lasting legacy for the benefit of African youth.²²

The goal of the "20 Centres for 2010"²³ charitable project is to raise 10 million USD to fund the construction of 20 Football for Hope Centres across Africa, five of which are to be located in South Africa. Previous World Cups have also been connected to charitable campaigns; for example, the 2006 Cup was connected to a campaign called "six villages for 2006."²⁴ This project linked donations from fans, organizations, and FIFA itself to fund six children's villages in Africa. The issue of the impact of the World Cup is also often mentioned in news articles. Blatter has mentioned that "the World Cup is intended to...generate social change"²⁵, and that "soccer is an antidote to Africa's long fight against disease, famine and poverty and centuries of slavery and racial discrimination"²⁶. While soccer may indeed be a valuable contributor to societies, whether a mega-event such as the 2010 FWC has had the aforementioned benefits for individuals at the grassroots in Africa in general and South Africa in particular remains to be seen, especially considering the associated spending on stadia and other infrastructure, which some scholars report draining resources from smaller, community-based

football programmes.

Alegi has reported that the investment in world-class stadiums in South Africa ahead of the 2010 FWC led to a dearth of resources for grass roots football in the country²⁷, at odds with the Western Cape Province's statement that "sports development in schools and clubs must experience measurable improvement as a result of hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup"²⁸. The focus on new stadiums around the country may lead to cutbacks in public subsidies for community sporting facilities, and the 2010 World Cup would thus "undermine, rather than strengthen, sorely needed development of grassroots sport"²⁹.

However, in contrast to these somewhat negative perceptions of the event, in a study of Cape Town residents' perceptions of the benefits of the construction of the Green Point stadium and the hosting of the 2010 FWC, Bob and Swart found that most residents believe that "South Africa will host the best World Cup ever which will leave positive legacies for the country"³⁰. They also note that residents "have high expectations in relation to realizing social and economic benefits"³¹. The reality of local football funding and grassroots expectations for the event frame what Smythe describes as an "audience commodity"³², created by FIFA for the World Cup and sold to sponsors. The sale of this commodity provides the 3.2 billion dollars worth of broadcast revenue for the event. The remainder of this paper explores the possibilities of a renewed South African national identity, the details and implications of the economics of the 2010 FWC, and the connection between the two, and ends with a discussion of the possibilities for further consideration of the role of sports mega-events in development and dependency.

A Renewed South African Identity and the 2010 FWC

Suspended in the global cultural flow and facilitated by Appadurai's five 'scapes', national identity is malleable. For South Africa, a major part of apartheid-era identity was composed of four legally imposed 'racial' divisions. Post-apartheid, the country's 1996 Constitution recognizes eleven national languages, upholds the power of traditional authorities, and includes a

Parliamentary system of representation. The country's diversity has been encapsulated in its identification as the "rainbow nation", a phrase commonly attributed to the Archbishop Desmond Tutu³³. For these and other reasons, which are sometimes referred to as the 'legacy of apartheid', it has been a difficult task for the government of South Africa to build a cohesive national identity. What's more, as Appadurai's complex model of 'scapes suggests, the process is no longer as simple as government imposition of patriotic (hegemonic) institutions or a new plan for unity. Instead, things like sports mega-events, national disasters, and other cataclysmic events contain the ingredients necessary for the renewal of national identity. But with such a mix of ingredients, the creation is never guaranteed to be positive, cohesive, or inclusive. Sports mega-events are considered a positive addition to the process because of their scale and the supposedly intrinsic values of humanism, unity, and courage. The 2010 FWC has thus been suggested as an opportunity to achieve the promise of multiculturalism in South Africa, and may be one of the few opportunities for the country to revive the 'African renaissance' project which was created from the ashes of the apartheid regime.³⁴

There are examples of the institution of global sport providing a nation with an updated identity, as in the case of China's renewed patriotism prior to and during the 2008 Olympics³⁵. In the case of South Africa, Smith and Kim reported that in 2003/2004 the country ranked 5th in the world in levels of national pride, or "feelings of patriotism and nationalism"³⁶. The 2007 Springbok rugby World Cup victory evoked new feelings of national pride and unity in South Africa suggesting that a successful 2010 FWC showing might lead to an increase in national pride³⁷. Kersting argues:

although group identities play an important role in South Africa, national identity is much higher [*sic*] than in most other countries with similar socio-cultural dynamics. Sport patriotism is the most important source of national identity and pride. It is important to note that even prior to the 2010 FWC, national identity as a researchable concept in South Africa was already much higher than in other countries.³⁸

Appadurai has suggested that "cricket, through the enormous convergence of state, media, and private sector interests, has come to be identified with

‘India’ ...the bodily pleasure that is at the core of the male viewing experience is simultaneously part of the erotics of nationhood”³⁹, turning the former mechanism of colonial control into a vehicle for the promotion of Indian identity. Likewise, soccer in Africa was intended to promote colonial control and social values. Darby notes that in former British colonies such as Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Zanzibar, colonial authorities decided that “state investment in and promotion of sport represented the most effective means of social control”. However, colonial football was not imbued with Victorian “English” values, as was cricket, and according to Darby “there were signs as early as the 1920s that football was beginning to be used as a way of challenging the imposition of European rule throughout the continent”. In South Africa, there is no single-minded national identification with football because of the competition with rugby and cricket for the attention of sports fans. Identification with sport in South Africa is at least partially connected to post-apartheid racial categories; soccer is seen as the domain of South Africans of African descent, rugby the domain of South Africans of European descent, and cricket the domain of South Africans of Indian descent, although these boundaries are flexible. Therefore, it is the spectacle of the 2010 FWC, rather than the sport as in Appadurai’s example of cricket, which may galvanize the nation into patriotic renewal and the creation of a strengthened national identity. Whether soccer can make a lasting contribution to bridging these divides depends on to what extent the sport can overcome its nearly singular association with Black⁴⁰ South African fandom and connect to members of other groups.

From a postmodern perspective, or at least from within the changes in the modern era which have led to reconsideration of a unified personal and national identity, South Africa’s political and rhetorical intention to reconnect individuals to the nation-state is an important study of the role of the state in preserving itself, something which may be, at least rhetorically, accomplished through mega-events. Considering the framework Appadurai has proposed, within the boundaries of the five ‘scapes is where the flow of global culture exists, and it is not difficult to imagine how the gigantic spectacle of the 2010 FWC might

contribute to the flow of culture in the interstices between Appadurai's 'scapes. For Appadurai, the master concept of "ideoscapes" takes on continually changing or varying meanings as it is influenced by the other concepts. In terms of the 2010 FWC, as ideoscapes are influenced by the movement of individuals (the ethnoscape), their money (the financescape), and the technology required to broadcast the 2010 FWC from and within South Africa (the technoscape), two things happen. The first result is the mediated presentation of the "triumphantly universal"⁴¹ – an important component of the humanitarian values presented by world sports mega-events, and by South Africa itself and its shift to democracy and the associated universal values of equality, human rights, and fairness. In an interview at the conclusion of the 2010 FWC, LOC Chair Danny Jordaan linked South Africa's history, the 2010 FWC, South African national identity, and the triumphantly universal, noting that:

It was only 20 years ago with apartheid when black and white couldn't have sat in a stadium together, couldn't have attended the same school or gone to the same beach... now you see white faces painted in Ghana colours. This World Cup has shown a non-sexist, non-racist, democratic South Africa. The fans' parks have been filled with black and white, abled and disabled. The nation has crossed a huge psychological barrier. There has been a special unity.

The second result of the disjunctures created by the 2010 FWC is the "resiliently particular"⁴², which was presented to the tourists and global audiences in human interest stories about South Africans, long shots of the ocean and Table Mountain from atop the Green Point stadium, and a renewed interest in the specific stories of the peaceful South African transition from apartheid, encapsulated in places like Soweto and other former townships. The flow of culture in this process can be found in the transmission of stories, the reclamation by some and the rejection by others of the portrayed South African identity, and in the negotiation of an identity that relies on yet transcends the country's historically legislated divisions.

Disjunctures between the 'scapes force a hybridisation of the individuals inhabiting them. In the case of the 2010 FWC, South Africans and the television audience have been touched by the seemingly endless disjunctures created by

locating a sports extravaganza which includes 32 teams from around the world in South Africa. I suggest that while the universal initially trumps the multiple identities of the individual, the unity connected to the spectacle quickly fades, and individuals in South Africa and elsewhere continue to negotiate hybrid identities, a part of which includes their experiences of the 2010 FWC, as well as ethnicity, nationality, and the racial legacy of apartheid. Considering this process as part of chaotic flows of culture within specific 'scapes helps explain both the possibilities of outcomes and the difficulties in returning to the modern conception of patriotic identification with the nation-state, the definition of which is thoroughly contested in a country like South Africa. The combination of South Africa's high levels of national identity and the spectacle of the 2010 FWC did lead to increased levels of national pride, closer identification with a South African-ness among the population, and at least a temporary bridging of the ethnic and language divides which characterise parts of the country.

Events which occurred in the country prior to the 2010 FWC highlighted still-present racial tensions, and the event's timing was fortunate in the sense of allowing all South Africans to participate in something larger than local racial politics, as sport in other contexts has accomplished. Indeed, even a superficial glance at what the 17,000 journalists have written about the event suggests that the media adopted the idea of a renewed South African whole-heartedly. From the Sunday Telegraph, Australia: "the 2010 World Cup means that football is now South Africa's game, a vehicle for national unity, national celebration, national pride". From the Christian Science Monitor: "the most enduring benefactor of the World Cup will be the national psyche and the quest for a common national identity to transcend a deeply divided past". These are but two examples of many of the ways in which the media's breathless adoption and endorsement of the ability of South African society to join together ignores not only the day-to-day experiences of many South Africans of all races who do not view identity as the critical issue in their lives, but also the actual economic cost of the 2010 FWC for grassroots South Africans.

Returning to Alegi and Cornelissen and Swart, who suggest a rhetorical link between development and sports in the media and elsewhere, the success and sustainability of a new South African identity and to a certain extent the survival of the South African state, also depend on the economic outcomes of the 2010 FWC, especially for previously disadvantaged individuals. Recent strikes and demonstrations in the country suggest that the pre-World Cup status quo may have returned, although this is usually described in the media as a “hangover”—albeit a worthwhile one.

Economics of the Media, Audience, and the 2010 FIFA World Cup

Estimates of the number of overseas visitors for the 2010 FWC suggest 350,000⁴³ would attend the event, with as many as 40 billion viewers in 207 countries⁴⁴. Both FIFA and the government of South Africa gained from the 2010 FWC. For FIFA, this economic gain occurred in the form of payments for broadcast rights, commercial time, and other merchandising revenue. For the government of South Africa, the fiduciary gains from the event are less tangible, especially considering some of the cost overruns which have occurred since the original bid. For example, original projections for stadium upgrades suggested that government’s contribution would be R2.3 billion⁴⁵; this was later increased to R9.8 billion⁴⁶. As of December 2008, the costs of the stadium upgrades were R3.2 billion over this R9.8 billion projection, meaning that the cost to government for stadium upgrades will be no less than R13 billion⁴⁷.

In addition, the construction of the high-speed rail link connecting Pretoria and Johannesburg, known as the Gautrain, is now estimated to cost South Africa R25.5 billion⁴⁸. While there are ongoing important benefits to South Africans from the construction of the Gautrain, its construction is also intended to facilitate transfers between OR Tambo international airport, Johannesburg city center, and points between during the 2010 FWC⁴⁹, a condition included in the bid agreement for the 2010 FWC. In terms of income, the government has suggested that the tourism industry will see R11 billion generated in revenues from the event⁵⁰. Mostly, benefits are expected to come in the form of intangibles, such as a higher profile of the country and increased foreign direct

investment (FDI), not to mention the previously discussed renewed national identity and pride.

As for the economic motivations of FIFA, Darby suggests that because Africa represents such a large political bloc within the world soccer community “those seeking FIFA’s most powerful administrative position [the presidency] will seek to present themselves as advocates of the African game.”⁵¹ The current FIFA president Josph Blatter has long supported an African World Cup. However, Blatter’s original support for the 2006 World Cup to be held on the continent was unsuccessful due to a last minute abstention from one New Zealand member of the voting committee⁵², leading to the exclusion of non-African nations in the 2010 bidding. As Darby⁵³ has demonstrated, a successful World Cup would create an important legacy for Blatter and potentially increase Africa’s importance in the future of FIFA.

Besides the legacy of the 2010 FWC for Blatter, it is clear that FIFA’s motivation for an African World Cup is not simply charitable. There is little doubt that the 2010 FWC (and the FIFA World Cup in general) is, if not the largest, arguably the most important sporting event on the planet. Globally, the top 25 football teams earned nearly \$7 billion in the 2007/2008 season⁵⁴ and are worth more now than in any previous year, despite the international economic crisis. The rights to broadcast soccer are extremely lucrative, and it has been estimated that the broadcast rights for the 2010 FWC alone are worth at least R25 billion, or greater than \$3 billion⁵⁵. In addition to broadcast revenues for FIFA, South Africa’s new place on the world stage via the 2010 FWC is also another opportunity for developed countries to develop and access the most powerful market on the continent.

Profits from broadcast and sponsorship rights do nothing to benefit members of grassroots constituencies in places like South Africa, where it has also been argued that South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FWC could harm the ability of local teams and grassroots level clubs to receive sponsorships or funding for

improvement of facilities. In addition to constraints on local football clubs, the ability of small-scale entrepreneurs to benefit from such a large event depends heavily on their ability to network, partially since the ability of tourists to access such small-scale facilities during the 2010 FWC will be limited, and because FIFA has partnered with one official hospitality agency, Match-AG, to provide hospitality services. In fact, the FIFA website notes that “MATCH Hospitality AG is the only company that has been authorised by FIFA to sell exclusive on-site hospitality packages including services and tickets for every match of the FIFA Confederations Cup 2009 and the 2010 FIFA World Cup”⁵⁶. Hospitality services, which include bed-and-breakfast establishments, tour operators, and restaurants to be included in these optional packages were certified by Match AG, leaving out many informal and small establishments.

FIFA is a non-profit organisation according to Swiss law, with a 2008 financial result of \$184 million in after-expense revenue⁵⁷. The organisation is charged with promoting “the game of association football in every way it deems fit”⁵⁸, and as a non-profit entity, uses its financial means to accomplish this mission. Since the organization is based in Europe, it is taxed and organized according to Swiss law, and all of the capital generated from the organization’s activities passes through Europe, and is then redistributed to Africa and elsewhere in support of football-related activities in such ways as FIFA determines appropriate. In terms of Africa, FIFA is currently promoting the “Win in Africa with Africa” program⁵⁹, which in 2008 has a budget of \$13 million for equipment, classes, and information technology investments on the continent. Considering the 2008 net result and FIFA’s net worth of more than \$900 million, this amount represents less than 10% reinvestment into Africa in terms of the development of the game, and is surprising, especially considering the role of African states in the governance of the organization.

From a postcolonial perspective, the opportunity and actual costs of building gigantic stadiums such as Green Point, which are later used in FIFA’s global broadcast of scenic backgrounds and iconic geography such as Table Mountain,

represents a clear shift of resources from the periphery to the core, in the tradition of Wallerstein⁶⁰. This process includes and is facilitated by FIFA's sponsor partners.

After the 2006 World Cup in Germany, FIFA reorganised its sponsorship program to include several levels of commitment. At the highest level, "FIFA Partners" receive "the highest level of association with FIFA...this means they own rights to a broader range of FIFA activities - be they competitions, special events or development programmes - as well as exclusive marketing assets"⁶¹. The intermediate level of sponsorship is called the **FIFA World Cup Sponsor**, and at this level the organisation's "rights are limited to the FIFA World Cup on a global basis...they consist of the right to category exclusivity, brand association, select marketing assets and secondary media exposure"⁶². Finally, national sponsorship refers to a level that "allows local companies to promote an association with the FIFA World Cup™ within the host country...the rights include category exclusivity, association, local marketing programmes and domestic media exposure"⁶³. FIFA Partners enjoy significantly more media exposure than the other levels of sponsorship, including "over 450 match days and tens of thousands of hours of live television broadcasts projected during the Rights Period [2007 – 2014]" and that "these competitions will visit new and emerging football markets such as China, Canada and South Africa, revisit co-hosts of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, Japan and Korea, and the enduring spiritual home of divine football, Brazil"⁶⁴. These sponsors paid nearly half a billion USD for these privileges in 2007 and 2008, and will continue to contribute to FIFA's bottom line until after the 2010 FWC is over⁶⁵. These three levels of sponsorship are intended to allow differentiation between sponsorships in order to promote FIFA soccer events besides the World Cup. Regarding the commercial value of the World Cup, the organization notes:

...the FIFA World Cup is the world's largest and most beloved sporting event, delivering measurable media value, category exclusivity and a genuine opportunity to reach core consumers, reinforce brand credibility in football and expand the boundaries of brand loyalty through an authentic marketing vehicle that boosts sales.⁶⁶

The “genuine opportunity to reach core customers” is at the heart of the creation of the “audience commodity” suggested by Smythe⁶⁷. The football fans, the identity issues, and the development imperatives connected to the hosting of the 2010 FWC in South Africa exist because of the sponsorship of organizations such as FIFA Partners Adidas, Sony, Coca-Cola, Emirates, Hyundai, and Visa; World Cup Sponsors Budweiser, Castrol, Continental, McDonald’s, MTN, and Satyam, and National Supporters FNB and Telkom⁶⁸. The fans provide revenue to sponsors; the promise of a renewed national identity suggests and requires participation from all levels of South African society, not only in the viewing but in consumption; and connecting development to sports mega-events justifies investment in tournament-related infrastructure, some of which may not contribute to development at all.

In terms of the economic benefits for the host country, stadium construction has often been touted as a way to increase income in a municipality, by either attracting or retaining a sports team⁶⁹, or in the case of South Africa, by raising the country’s profile among potential tourists and thus increasing travel to the country. Many of the projected 159,000 jobs connected to the 2010 FWC are connected to the construction or upgrades of ten stadiums which are being built or upgraded as part of the preparations for the 2010 FWC⁷⁰. After the 2010 FWC, stadia will be managed by a variety of independent, outside organizations, with the municipalities receiving a percentage of the profit from stadium revenues. For example, the Green Point Stadium in Cape Town, one of the more controversial upgrades, will be managed by a French/South African consortium, and will provide 30% of its earnings to the city of Cape Town after the 2010 FWC.⁷¹

In contrast to the river of funds which flowed to FIFA during the 2010 FWC, the literature suggests a variety of opinions on the potential economic benefits for South African stakeholders, especially those at the grassroots. Many individuals in South Africa have expressed doubts that the much-heralded benefits will materialise. For example, Darkey and Horn interviewed 100 hospitality-industry

entrepreneurs in Gauteng province and found that “56%...were not enthused by the economic prospects of 2010 FWC”⁷². Pillay and Bass suggest that “evidence from the international literature unequivocally suggests that more widespread development benefits are not a direct consequence of spending associated with mega-events...inequality may even be exacerbated by the hosting of the World Cup”⁷³. Previously I noted that residents of Cape Town had positive expectations about the results of the hosting of the 2010 FWC. Other literature suggests that the benefits of sports mega-events for local non-construction businesses are often disappointing, as locals stay away from downtown business districts while athletes and visitors make purchases at the game sites⁷⁴. While the anticipated benefits for FIFA are uncontroversially positive, those for individuals and South African society are decidedly mixed. Substituting for positive economic outcomes, the focus on the creation of a renewed national identity and other intangible benefits, such as potential increases in foreign direct investment and making a name for South Africa, allow organizers, FIFA, and other high-level stakeholders to capitalise on South Africa’s triumphantly universal story, while profiting handsomely from broadcast revenues, construction contracts, and other related investments. The South African media have also played an important role in building support for the event and promoting potential benefits of the 2010 FWC.

Transformations in the South African Media and the 2010 FWC

The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was the official broadcast partner of FIFA for the 2010 World Cup, and to a certain extent, represents the ultimate booster for the event. This organisation, which is ostensibly a public broadcaster⁷⁵ and symbolic of South Africa’s transition in 1994, has since the first democratic elections been moving away from its apartheid legacy of government news agency. At that time, the complex relationships between journalists and media houses, media consumers, and the government all changed overnight as a democratically elected government assumed control of the state broadcaster, laws controlling reporting were changed, and a new constitution was written. However, the majority of journalists were still White, male, and

middle class⁷⁶, which meant that many of the hoped-for transformations in the media did not occur. More importantly, Jacobs notes that many of the expected changes in the country's economic systems did not happen⁷⁷, and the media contributed to this problem by avoiding "hard hitting analysis"⁷⁸. Politically, media messages are still often charged with the tension of racial politics, often thinly disguised as economic class issues⁷⁹, leading to skepticism and cynicism among some audiences.

In terms of a critical consideration of the benefits of a sports mega-event like the 2010 FWC, literature suggests that sports media is more likely to adopt a boosterish, rather than critical, position. Sugden and Tomlinson noted that sports journalists "overlook economic and political aspects of sport, give dominant sports stars and sports preferential treatment, and all but ignore the grass roots of sport"⁸⁰. Carlson⁸¹ found that South African newspaper stories regarding the 2010 FWC tended to rely primarily on government or other official sources and as a whole were positively biased in their coverage of World Cup related events. Although the print media sector in South Africa is still vibrant, and numerous journalists have covered the ongoing preparations for the 2010 FWC, there is little interest among media outlets for harsh criticism of the government's progress. Instead, journalists are often more at home with official sources and comfortable story lines. South African journalists also have a significant stake in the country's success in hosting the 2010 FWC, and for this reason their boosterism is not necessarily unexpected.

However, there are many interests involved in the hosting of the 2010 FWC, and the media, in the form of newspapers, local television, and radio, may be argued to have had an important role in informing the public not only of the opportunities connected with the event but also about the opportunity costs associated with spending large sums on stadiums and infrastructure. The 2.89 billion rand (\$321 million) initially budgeted for the Green Point stadium in Cape Town alone would have gone a long way to alleviating many of the

country's structural problems; the media have a role in promoting discussion of these events among the people of South Africa.

Conclusion: Identity, Economics, and the 2010 FWC

As Appadurai suggests, it is in the global disjunctures between the media, finance, ethnicity, and technology that a post-modern, postcolonial identity is developed. Mega-events like the 2010 FWC are a nexus for these disjunctures as they provide the sponsoring organisation (FIFA) with a gigantic audience commodity, deliver hundreds of thousands of tourists to the host country's shores, require immense financing, and, in some cases, change the technological landscape. All of these are certainly true of South Africa's turn at hosting the event: in addition to the tourist figures previously mentioned, the event was expected to draw billions of worldwide viewers⁸²; as of 2008, stadium upgrades alone total more than R13 billion⁸³; and a new undersea fibre optic cable, SEACOM, was officially connected to South Africa on July 23, 2009⁸⁴, which facilitated interconnection to the rest of the world during the 2010 FWC and will continue to do so after. All of these events have implications for the creation and maintenance of identity, which, as Bhabha suggests, "is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity...it is always the production of the image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image"⁸⁵. This constant production and transformation challenge the construction of a stable, unified identity in South Africa or anywhere else.

In considering who benefits from the 2010 FWC, and the possibilities for a shift in global perceptions of Africa in general and South Africa in particular after the event, this paper has explored the possibilities for a renewed and strengthened South African identity and the economic circumstances surrounding the event. The economic data, particularly from FIFA, together with the political economy of the event, suggests that the 2010 FWC has recreated colonial patterns of shifting wealth from Africa to Europe, with some significant benefits for a minority of South African powerbrokers. Although the economic benefits, at least for members of the grassroots, may be minimal, both local and international organizers have proposed the possibility of a strengthened South African identity

that will temporarily overcome racial divisions left over from apartheid. However, as this paper has shown, building a lasting, unified South African identity is complicated and multidimensional. FIFA is the undisputed winner of the World Cup, no matter what year it occurs, and the host country must be content, in the main, with the dubious prospect of “changing the terms of Africa’s recognition in the world”⁸⁶.

This is no doubt an important and worthwhile undertaking, given what is assumed to be broad misunderstandings and pervasive negative stereotypes of the continent. But the measure of this recognition will not be intangible changes such as greater respect for and better understanding of African cultures and institutions. Instead, governments, organizations, and pundits will ask whether South Africa and the continent are the beneficiaries of more foreign direct investment, greater engagement with global markets, and more international visitors, or in other words, whether the intangibles promised by the 2010 FWC are having measurable economic impact⁸⁷. As long as this is the case, the terms of recognition will remain the same, and rather than defining itself, South Africa will continue to be defined by the West, economically and culturally.

Perhaps FIFA’s motivation in promoting the World Cup product is not entirely self-serving; the event may leave lasting development in the form of infrastructure and knowledge within the host country. At the grassroots, individuals in South Africa will have the opportunity to negotiate the disjunctures presented by the 2010 FWC, which may contribute to the fulfilment of the rhetorical promise to “carve a name” for South Africa. However, as Africa in general and South Africa in particular begin to embrace the promise of the African renaissance, the definition of what it means to be African should not be guided or constrained by institutions that recreate colonial conditions. Rather than using mega-events like the 2010 FWC to accomplish development, political, and diplomatic goals, the continent should use its resources, both human and natural, to do so. Mega-events may then play a part, rather than a

leading role, in an overall agenda of engagement with the world.

I suggest that continued analysis of the benefits of sports mega-events such as the 2010 FWC should take place considering the implications of the creation of the audience commodity, the effect on the creation of renewed national pride and identity, and the sustainability of the economic effects. Simple economic analyses cannot be accurate predictors of the results of such events, nor should surveys of national pride and identity be taken as the final arbiters of success. For events like the 2010 FWC to leave lasting positive legacies in Africa, rather than recreating colonial channels for the flow of money, host countries should include these considerations in their analyses of the potential benefits of the events.

The contribution of the 2010 FWC to the creation of a unified South African identity is yet to be seen. However, as I have written in this paper, one possibility for understanding the spaces in which new aspects of identity may emerge is suggested by Appadurai in the intersection of his five “scapes”. The intersections of people, finance, ideas, and technology connected to the 2010 FWC are the places from which will emerge some aspects of deterritorialized identity heretofore not seen. The fact that the 2010 FWC was held on African soil for the first time meant an opportunity for new cultural elements to emerge in these spaces, and these elements are much more complicated than simply carving a name for Africa and erasing Afropessimism. While political rhetoric has suggested these outcomes are important intangible results of the 2010 FWC, this essay has shown that they function as a substitute for economic benefits of the event, which primarily go to FIFA at the expense of the host country. Members of the grassroots, who have been proposed as the beneficiaries of the event’s “upliftment” must be content with the hope that a unified South African identity will somehow lead to later economic empowerment.

Notes

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⁸⁶ Mbembe, Achille. 2006. '2010 Soccer World Cup: Where Is the Moral Argument?' Published online (31/10, 2006) in *Africultures, Cultures Africaines*: www.africultures.com. This quote was part of the call for papers for this issue of *Postamble*; Mbembe outlines the ways in which the 2010 FWC can and will impact South African society and Africa in general. However, the question, as posed by a participant in the research accompanying this paper, is why it takes a mega-event for governments and individuals to make significant investments in infrastructure and culture?

⁸⁷ The question is always who will be the ones who benefit. Many SMME owners view the 2010 FWC as an opportunity to present their businesses to the outside world, to be seen by potential investors and tourists, which is expected to lead to more business opportunities; however, my impression from research is that it is often difficult for them to make contact with investors and when they do, investors often find it preferable to deal with larger, more established organizations.